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The Catalan territorial conflict is stuck. That is not good news here. It does not mean that
the conflict is being contained or the escalation stopped or anything like that. “Stuck”
means that no clear solutions are on the table right now. That secessionists revalidated
their parliamentary majority in the elections in Catalonia last week (despite the fact that they
are also “stuck” in terms of popular support with 47% of the votes). That secessionist
leaders persist, that they think they possess the democratic legitimacy required to advance
in their way to independence. That Carles Puigdemont, the ousted regional President, is
“stuck” in Brussels with three other former Ministers of his cabinet, insisting that they are in
the exile, unable to come back to their country. That Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, after
pushing the “nuclear button” of Article 155, is not willing to negotiate or come to any
plausible solution, other than letting judicial prosecutions go and blocking any possibility of
a legal referendum. That the Spanish Socialist Party is also “stuck” in backing Mr. Rajoy’s
immobility, and in insisting on a constitutional reform that has no clear horizon, and which is
virtually impossible to materialize given Partido Popular’s lack of enthusiasm about it.  And
“stuck” means that no other European or international actor, with the exception of the Pope,
has truly tried to help the main parties in the conflict to find ways of peaceful and
democratic solution. Stuck, stuck, stuck. Everything is stuck in this conflict right now, and
this is not good news. But who’s responsible for that?
Let me say it quite clearly: the Catalan conflict is our problem. Not the Catalan problem, not
the Spanish problem, only. It is our common European problem. All European citizens, and
particularly the European institutions, should be concerned about it, and should collaborate
to find appropriate solutions. The fact that the conflict is “stuck” right now is bad news for
everyone in the EU. And yes, finding a solution is the primary responsibility of Catalans and
Spaniards. But all Spaniards are European citizens, we are all part of a common political
project with the rest of European peoples, a project based on the fundamental values of
human dignity, freedom, democracy, the rule of law, peace, and well-being, among others.
And we all share the responsibility to promote such values across the Union, and all
peoples have a clear duty of solidarity among themselves. Catalans and Spaniards are
failing so far to find solutions to the problem. But it is our European common problem and
our common responsibility to try to help them. More specifically, EU institutions should be
doing much more of what they have done so far. I blame them for their passivity in the last
couple of months.
The Facts
As I said in my previous post, and pace T.S. Eliot, last October has been Catalonia’s
cruelest month. In early September we initiated our descent into hell in seven steps. And all
attempts to avoid the paramount irrationality of declaring an independence for which
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Catalonia was not fully determined and not even ready to implement on practical grounds,
failed one after another. Despite a last-minute mediation by the Basque Lehendakari
(President) Iñigo Urkullu that – in October 26th – seemed to succeed in convincing
Puigdemont to call for elections first, Puigdemont finally asked the Catalan Parliament to
solemnly declare independence on the 27th. The Declaration was approved by secret ballot
– an exceptional process in the Parliament – to shield secessionist MPs from legal
liabilities; and it was passed as a “non-legal provision”, normally used for merely symbolic
acts. It was passed with 70 votes in favor (out of 135), 10 negative ones, 2 abstentions, and
the rest of MPs being absent of the chamber as a form of protest. Despite the intended
solemnity of the event, there was no real parliamentary debate, the opposition leaders were
not permitted to question the President or to discuss any aspect of the resolution, and a
clear awareness of doing something illegal and shameful among the secessionist MPs was
palpable. Much to secessionists’ own dismay, later on we heard secessionist leaders
admitting that such declaration was only symbolic, that it lacked any legal validity and
effects, and that they were fully aware that it was going to have no political significance
either. It is difficult not to get upset by such a confession, whether you are secessionist or
not. Civil order and democracy in Catalonia was being jeopardized just for an aesthetic
move.
In any case, secessionists, within the Parliament and outside, celebrated the declaration
with joy and ecstasy. The Parliament opened doors to hundreds of Catalan secessionist
Mayors (there are 947 municipalities in Catalonia, most of them tiny and rural, where
independentism gets much of its force), and they took pictures of themselves to remember
that historical day. The Catalan media reported that the Catalan Republic had been
declared. But the joy was extenuated by the awareness that nobody really thought that
Catalonia was going to be actually independent. And, I must say, I’ve heard more petards
and fireworks and seen more people jumping and dancing in the streets when Barça wins
the Spanish football League – let alone the European Champions League –, than in
October 27th. In fact, the Spanish Senate authorized that same day the activation of Article
155 of the Spanish constitution, which allows the central government to intervene in the
government of an Autonomous Community when it violates severely its constitutional
duties or seriously harms the general interest of Spain. And everyone informed knew very
well that the declaration was not going to be effective at all.
What happened next is well known: No government, no important organization, no central
actor on earth recognized the new Catalan state. Many of them, indeed, rushed to issue an
official statement making it very clear that they considered the declaration contrary to
Spanish law and giving firm support to the government of Mr. Rajoy. It is impossible to
know with certainty what kind of phone calls and secret communications were made that
day among intelligence agencies and powerful organizations of all sorts. What is obvious,
until the opposite is proved, is that Catalan independentists had no international ally
whatsoever on their side, neither governmental nor private.
Immediately afterwards, on Sunday 29th Puigdemont flew with five of his ministers to
“exile” in Brussels – although one of them came back home afterwards. By doing so they
avoided the order to appear before the judge who is investigating their case (in Spain it is
the pre-trial judge the one who investigates, not the public attorney). They avoided also a
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very likely pre-trial detention, even if some of the ministers who stayed here, despite being
immediately detained, were finally released when their judicial process was backlogged in
the Supreme Court. Many secessionists were expecting some acts of passive resistance to
“defend the Catalan autonomous institutions”, as they said. But instead of organizing that,
the government disbanded and partly fled to Brussels in a clear attempt to internationalize
the conflict.
A few days after the declaration, Article 155 was officially enforced. It is important to clarify
that this Article does not imply the suspension of the Autonomy in Catalonia. But it allows
the central government to make the necessary interventions to redress a situation of
unconstitutionality. The limits of that permission are controversial in Spanish Constitutional
law. The Article, an import from German Constitutional Law, has never been activated,
neither in Spain nor in Germany. Many have argued that Article 155 cannot be used to
suspend a regional parliament. Some think that it cannot cover the suspension of the
regional president either, or a call for elections, which is a presidential prerogative.
Interventions from the central government must be limited just to redress the decisions or
initiatives that had violated the constitutional legality. That remains, as I said, unclear. If it is
true, then Mr. Rajoy’s actual use of Article 155 might have been unconstitutional. We will
see, eventually, whether the Constitutional Court is of the same opinion.
The interventions made by the central government, however, have been much less
aggressive than what many people expected. Even if the President and his ministers have
been removed from their offices, the ministries have not been fully brought under control,
the Catalan public broadcasting has not been neutralized or tampered with, the education
system is unchanged, and the administration of Catalonia is basically going on as before.
What is more, calling for elections in December 21st with the aim of letting the new
Parliament elect a new government in January and let such new government rule
autonomously again as soon as possible, was an unexpected move that shortened the
period of application of Article 155 to its minimum. That does not mean neither that
activating Article 155 was necessarily the best idea to deal with the terrible political
situation, nor that its implementation is fully constitutional. But, frankly, things could have
gone much worse.
It is important to say that in the days before the declaration of independence many were
expecting the conflict to spiral out of control, with violence on the street and maybe even
casualties. That this did not happen is a reason for gratitude and a token of responsibility
on both sides – the comparatively mild response from Rajoy and the decision of
Puigdemont and his cabinet to avoid an open confrontation, dissolve the crowds in the
streets, and fly away. You can imagine how this deeply disappointed some secessionist
citizens and organizations. It was a tough decision to be made.
After the activation of Article 155, all secessionist parties publicly “accepted” the elections
and announced very early in November that they were going to run. They rejected the
intervention and declared to be determined to defend the autonomy of Catalonia. But they
did nothing to prevent or obstruct its enforcement. They basically cooperated with the
central government’s decisions, with the judicial orders being issued, and with police. The
left-wing independist party ERC immediately acknowledged that they had committed
several mistakes, like having followed a “unilateral strategy” that implied breaking the law
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and social peace in Catalonia, and proceeding to a declaration of independence while
lacking sufficient popular support.
We had a quiet November, and a very quiet, even boring, electoral campaign in December.
All debates were insubstantial, with all political parties blaming each other for the conflict.
The citizenry, after such a Red October, was mostly caught in a sort of post-traumatic
stress disorder. Secessionists were mostly depressed after realizing that independence
was still a phantom, that the Catalan government was unprepared and had admittedly lied
about the prospects of becoming a real Republic, and that their cause had virtually no
international ally, and thus no chance to succeed in the short-run. Non-secessionists were
still in shock about the events of the previous weeks. Spanish nationalists in Catalonia and
the rest of Spain started demonstrating and hanging Spanish flags from the balconies, but
other than that they kept relatively quiet.
And then came the election, the most important in the history of Catalonia with an
unprecedented voter turnout of 82%. Ciutadans, the new unionist right-wing party, came in
first with 25% of votes; Junts per Catalunya, the list of Puigdemont, second with 22%; and
his former coalition partner ERC third with 21%. The three secessionist parties combined
had lost two seats but kept the majority. However, with only 47% of the votes and a slight
decline compared to the last election in 2015, they once again failed to get a popular
majority for their secessionist aims. Moreover, many people had the impression that
secessionist citizens cast their votes not out of enthusiasm and hope, but rather resigned
and hopeless, but fearful of the alternative. Thus, despite the reiteration of results,
something has changed in Catalonia. A majority of Catalans, for the third consecutive
election, voted for non-independentist parties, that is, they voted against the independence
of Catalonia. At the same time, Partido Popular, Mr. Rajoy’s party, plummeted down to the
7th position with only 4% of the votes. And this is how we got stuck in the current situation,
with no clear prospect in one way or another.
In the next few weeks the Parliament will have to choose the next President of the Catalan
government. Secessionists are deeply divided about this. Some argue that Puigdemont
should be restored in office to reverse the effects of Article 155 – that was the message
they emphasized during the campaign, and Puigdemont had promised to return to
Catalonia if that happened. Others point out that he cannot be elected president in
absentia, while he stays exiled in Brussels, and that if he tries to meet his promise and
come back he will be immediately detained. Another candidate would be ERC leader Oriol
Junqueras, who lost to Puigdemont and is still in jail, in pre-trial detention. The non-
secessionists, on the other hand, seem unable to rally behind a common candidate. This
moment of uncertainty would be ideal for Mr. Rajoy to offer an alternative and attractive
deal that might persuade some moderate secessionists and build a multilateral wide
consensus in Catalonia. But there is no sign that he will be interested in anything else than
reiterating his support to judicial prosecutorial decisions. Thus, everything indicates that the
deadlock, caused by the political short-sightedness of our mediocre political elites, will
continue for an undetermined length of time.
An EU’s common problem
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The non-Spanish reader might be feeling some compassion or concern about the political
situation in Catalonia. But as I said above, this is not only a Catalan or a Spanish problem.
Catalonia is a part of Europe. And the European Union is much more than a club or an
international organization. It is a polity, with several political institutions, including a
representative Parliament. The Catalan political situation is our common European
problem. And I will end this post by offering two arguments – one legal, the other political,
and I will leave aside the moral one – to call for an intervention of the EU institutions in the
conflict.
First of all, I hold a European passport. I firmly believe in the European project of “creating
an ever closer union of the peoples of Europe” (art. 1 TEU). I believe in a European Union
that is genuinely “founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy,
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights”, among others (art. 2 TUE). A Union
whose main aim is “to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples” (art. 3.1
TUE); which should “offer its citizens and area of freedom, security and justice” (art. 3.2
TUE), and “promote economic, social and territorial cohesion” (art. 3.3 TUE). A Union,
finally, that pursues “the principle of sincere cooperation” should engage with Member
States in “mutual respect, assist[ing] each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the
Treaties” (art. 4 TUE).
I, the Union citizen José Luis Martí, have a right to be protected by European institutions.
Such “institutions shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with
representative associations and civil society” (art. 11.2 TUE). I would expect the European
Council to care about internal substantial conflicts which are threatening the values of the
Union. The Council has the Treaty-based duty to “provide the Union with the necessary
impetus for its development and shall define the general political directions and priorities
thereof” (art. 15.1 TUE). And I would expect, above all, an active intervention from the
European Commission given that it is presumed to have the responsibility to “promote the
general interest of the Union and take appropriate initiatives to that end. It shall ensure the
application of the Treaties, and of measures adopted by the institutions pursuant to them”
(art. 17.1 TUE). And, of course, I expect the European Parliament, the body that is meant
to directly represent me and my fellow citizens in Catalonia and Spain (art. 10.2 TUE), to
get actively involved to assist the parties of the conflict to find adequate solutions.
I have a legal right to be assisted by my European institutions, the Council, the Commission
and the Parliament. And nothing prevents them from doing it. They could intervene in many
different ways and in different degrees of intensity. They could hold a hearing, they could
intermediate as an impartial arbitrator, they could explore and suggest solutions. And if
everything else fails, they could activate Article 7 of the Treaty. Article 7, which might be
triggered by the Commission, the Parliament, or a number of Member States, establishes
that the Council “may determine that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member
State of the values referred to in Article 2” and it gives the Council prerogatives to “invite”
the affected state to follow its recommendations, and even penalizing it with the suspension
of certain rights if the conduct is not redressed.
Some may think that Article 7, often misnomed the „nuclear option“, would constitute a huge
overreaction. But this is precisely the procedure that the European Commission just
triggered on December 20th regarding the judicial reform in Poland right now. I don’t
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underestimate the severeness of that case, and the activation of Article 7 may well be
justified. But the harm for democracy, equality, and the rule of law that we are witnessing in
Spain in these months are by no means incomparable. Don’t get me wrong, I’m not
suggesting that the Catalan conflict is the Spanish central government’s fault, and that the
European institutions should intervene to reprimand and even penalize Madrid. All what I
am arguing is that the role of European institutions, my institutions, should not be of total
passivity in a major conflict like this, especially when the parties involved have proven to be
unable to find adequate solutions.
But let me go beyond this legal argument. Political philosophers have struggled for
decades to provide a good answer to the so-called demos problem. The traditional
response was that all those legally subject to a political decision should have the chance to
participate, directly or indirectly, in making it. But, of course, such a criterion is arbitrary and
circular. It is arbitrary because it depends on what the law actually establishes. What is
more, it might precisely be what is at stake, as it happens in the current political conflict in
Catalonia, when secessionists challenge the idea that the only legitimate demos in Spain is
the whole Spanish one. It is circular because the question is who should be able to
participate in making the law, so we cannot presuppose that the law has already been
made to establish the criterion of subjectedness.
The main alternative, the one that is more popular among theorists nowadays, is the all-
affected principle. All those who are affected by a decision in a meaningful way should be
able to participate in the decision, although this is compatible with having different people
with different forms and degrees of involvement. Now, it is obvious that the major political
conflict that we face in Catalonia clearly affects not only Catalans and Spaniards, but also
the rest of Europeans. And for that reason I think all Europeans should feel concerned
about what is happening now here. I do not suggest that they should all share the same
degree of responsibility or equal vote in finding a stable decision. But they should all have a
say and they should also feel some responsibility in the conflict. I am not talking about
having an option or a privilege. I talk about having a duty.
The European Union is surrounded by many terrible political conflicts, some of them
occurring in as close as the other side of the Mediterranean Sea. In a globalized world as
the one in which we live in, I think the European Union should have a much more active
role in helping other international actors to solve their major problems, either because that
is what Articles 2, 3.1 and 8 TUE establish or because it is in our own self-interest to pacify
neighbor regions or to avoid international conflicts. We may have a legal and moral duty to
do so, but I also think it is largely optional. And, more specifically, I do not think the EU has
a political duty to intervene in international conflicts. But this is where the Catalan case is
different. We are not talking about an international crisis. It is a major conflict that has
exploded within our borders, and which involves our fellow citizens. That is why I demand
from the European Institutions, my institutions, to get involved and assist the parties to
preserve the values we share and on which our common Union is grounded. How else can
we really say that we are creating the “firm bases for the construction of the future Europe”?
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